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Abstract
The electoral franchise has become more universal as restrictions based on criteria 
such as sex or property have been lifted throughout the process of democratisation. 
Yet, a broad range of exclusions has persisted to this date, making the suffrage non-
universal, even in established democracies. In this article, we present ELECLAW, a 
new set of indicators that captures the subtle and variegated legal landscape of per-
sisting electoral rights restrictions. We measure the inclusiveness of the right to vote 
and the right to stand as candidate across four levels and three types of elections for 
three categories of voters: citizen residents, non-citizen residents, and non-resident 
citizens. ELECLAW currently covers fifty-one democracies in three different conti-
nents (the Americas, Europe, and Oceania) depicting the legal situation in 2015. The 
article introduces the methodology used for building the indicators so as to make it 
transparent to the broader research community. To this aim, it successively unpacks 
the conceptualisation underlying the indicators, explains the measurement by pro-
viding specific examples, and discusses the merits of a differentiated and context-
driven method of aggregation.
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Introduction
Who can vote? And who can stand as a candidate? The answers to these questions 
lie at the heart of democracy. Only those included in the demos can elect representa-
tives, and who can become a representative hinges upon who can run for office in 
the first place.
In the past two centuries, the suffrage has become more universal, as restrictions 
based on property, literacy, religion, sex or race have been gradually lifted through 
a global diffusion of the democratic ideal. The process has not been an irresistible 
march towards a fully universal endpoint, but a fiercely contested struggle punctu-
ated by episodes of retrenchment, and expansion that were simultaneously fought in 
local, regional, national, and supranational arenas (Rokkan 1999: 247–257). Today, 
the battle of the suffrage has not come to an end. Instead, it is being fought along dif-
ferent frontlines. While significantly less contentious than in the past and affecting 
smaller segments of the population, it reveals the same tension between the demo-
cratic promise of equality and a reality of pervasive differentiation. The exclusion of 
prisoners or persons with a mental disability, for instance, remains a divisive issue in 
most contemporary democracies. Another particularly widespread and controversial 
form of disenfranchisement stems from international migration, as a result of which 
non-naturalised immigrants are often excluded from elections held in their country 
of residence and, to a lesser degree, in their country of citizenship (Earnest 2015; 
Pedroza 2015; Spiro 2006; Arrighi and Bauböck 2017). In democratically governed 
states, regions, and cities, these infringements to the sacrosanct principle of univer-
sal suffrage have sparked debates about the very nature of the political community 
and the essential qualities of citizenship, resulting in frequent changes in the elec-
toral law. Ultimately, a broad range of more or less severe restrictions has persisted 
to this date, making suffrage non-universal, even in established democracies.
In this article, we present ELECLAW, a new set of indicators designed to meas-
ure the inclusiveness of the right to vote (VOTLAW) and the right to stand as can-
didate (CANLAW) across four levels (supranational, national, regional, and local) 
and three types of elections (executive, legislature, and referendum) for three cat-
egories of voters (citizen residents, non-citizen residents, and non-resident citizens) 
(GLOBALCIT 2019). The dataset currently covers 371 kinds of elections in fifty-
one democracies in three different continents (the Americas, Europe, and Oceania), 
depicting the legal situation in 2015, and, for the subset of elections held within the 
EU-28, in both 2013 and 2015.1 In the future, we plan to continue updating the data 
and expanding the coverage to other world regions as well as back in time.
ELECLAW captures the subtle and variegated legal reality of both voting rights 
and candidacy rights across established democracies in a comprehensive and 
1 The following countries are included: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bul-
garia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Par-
aguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, 
USA, Uruguay, Venezuela.
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fine-grained way. It zooms in on the very edge of the new frontiers of the demos, as 
it is expanding and contracting beyond membership and territory, but also (re-)defin-
ing internal boundaries within the resident citizenry. Identifying a broad range of 
variation across groups of potential voters, levels of government, and types of elec-
tions, it widens the horizon of the scholarship on democracy measurement by focus-
ing on the democratic quality of electoral inclusiveness (see Blatter et al. 2015a).
The main purpose of this article is to introduce the methodology used for build-
ing the index to make it transparent to the broader research community. After pro-
viding a justification for the need of ELECLAW in the next section, the presentation 
follows the silver thread that has become common practice in index building (Munck 
and Verkuilen 2002). We successively unpack the conceptualisation underlying the 
indicators, explain the measurement by providing specific examples, and discuss 
the merits of a differentiated method of aggregation. Our discussion primarily aims 
to highlight the most significant methodological challenges we encountered when 
building the index. As such, it does not describe all aspects of the indicators, nor 
present the comparative empirical findings. For a comprehensive description, inter-
ested readers and users can consult our explanatory note (Schmid et  al. 2019). A 
glimpse at our comparative results for each of our category of voters is available in 
the online supplementary file, as well as on our interactive visualisation web page.
ELECLAW builds upon the data made available by the Global Citizenship Obser-
vatory (GLOBALCIT).2 Like many existing indices, users may freely download the 
data disaggregated to the lowest level and in full knowledge of how it was processed. 
However, note that the resources made available by GLOBALCIT go one step fur-
ther: for each score, users may consult the corresponding legal provision summa-
rised in our Conditions for Electoral Rights Database, access the original full text 
legislation in our National Electoral Law Database, and place the legislation in the 
broader political and historical context in which it came about thanks to our Country 
Reports on Access to Electoral Rights.3
Towards the inclusion of inclusiveness
The ubiquity of the new battles of the suffrage recently caught the eye of norma-
tive theorists. It revived a long-standing puzzle on the “problem of inclusion” (Dahl 
1989: 119–133) that earlier generations of philosophers took issue with, from John 
2 GLOBALCIT (www.globa lcit.eu) is a research observatory within the Robert Schuman Centre of 
Advanced Studies at the European University Institute in Florence (Italy). It provides fact-based and non-
partisan analysis of citizenship laws and policies around the globe.
3 All the data collected for building the indicators as well as the disaggregated dataset in csv or xls for-
mat can be freely accessed and downloaded on the Electoral Rights web page of GLOBALCIT at www.
globa lcit.eu/elect oralr ights . This includes the comparative database Conditions for Electoral Rights 
(CER 2017; see Piccoli et al. 2017), the Country Reports Series on Access to Electoral Rights, and the 
ELECLAW indicators interactive visualisation page.
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Stuart Mill to Joseph Schumpeter (see, inter alia, Arrhenius 2018; Bauböck 2015, 
2017; Beckman 2009; Goodin 2007; López-Guerra 2014). But while the debate 
struck back with a vengeance in political theory, it has been largely left at the mar-
gins of empirical scholarship on democracy measurement. In fact, there is a gap 
between the conceptualisation of inclusion as a necessary condition for democracy 
on the one hand and the actual content of existing democracy measures on the other 
(Blatter et al. 2015a). Although Dahl’s concept of “polyarchy” (1971) operated with 
two dimensions of contestation and inclusiveness, over the next decades the strong 
empirical focus of democracy measurement and research on contestation has turned 
into “the common assumption that most existing indicators of democracy measure 
the same single dimension” (Coppedge et al. 2008).
Based on a large array of existing indicators, Michael Coppedge and colleagues 
(ibid.) have demonstrated that this assumption is wrong. Instead, their compilation 
of indicators reveals two empirical dimensions, which can be understood as con-
testation and inclusiveness. However, the inclusiveness indicators focus on funda-
mental aspects such as the existence of adult suffrage for both genders in the group 
of resident citizens, or refer to de facto participation rates (Vanhanen 1990) rather 
than electoral laws as such. Hence, existing indicators cannot detect legal differences 
along the new frontiers of suffrage. Instead, they are tools to trace democratisation 
processes.
The more recent wave of democracy measurement has two streams. The first 
flows towards the quality of democracy, while the second drifts towards the varieties 
of democracy (Blatter et  al. 2015a). For instance, the Democracy Barometer aims 
to capture differences between established democracies and their democratic qual-
ity (Bühlmann et al. 2012). It features measures of voting and candidacy rights, but 
they are crude in design (summative scales with dichotomous indicators; see Merkel 
et al., 2016: 44–45, 51–52) and conflate different target groups (including non-citi-
zen residents and non-resident citizens), while only considering national legislative 
elections. In addition, the indicators are of marginal importance for the aggregate 
score of democratic quality, which is based on a total of one hundred indicators (for 
a more detailed discussion see Blatter et al. 2015a: 21–22).
The core idea of the Varieties of Democracy project is that while democracy 
comes in different shades, both normatively and empirically, at the heart of any 
conception there are free and fair (or contested and inclusive) elections (Coppedge 
et  al. 2011). However, the core suffrage indices measure the de facto inclusion of 
adult citizen residents in national elections only (Coppedge et al. 2018; for a more 
detailed discussion see Blatter et  al. 2015a: 22–24). Moreover, the data indicate 
that, at least in the new millennium, all established democracies have a perfect 
score on these indicators (ibid.). The same problem arises in the study by Paxton 
et al. (2003), which is focused solely on suffrage: while various restrictions such as 
those for criminal convicts, the mentally disabled, non-citizen residents, and non-
resident citizens are considered, the resulting measure shows very little variation 
across established democracies. Besides, again, only national legislative elections 
are considered.
It is at this frontier of democracy measurement that ELECLAW comes in. 
It can be used to comprehensively and systematically compare the legal shape of 
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the demos regarding multiple groups of voters, multiple levels of government, and 
multiple types of elections. We hope that in doing so we can help pave the way for 
research analysing the degrees, causes, and consequences of electoral inclusiveness 
in the context of international migration and multilevel politics across established 
democracies in the twenty-first century.
Conceptualisation
In a representative democracy, individuals may participate in elections in two ways: 
by voting and by standing as candidates. In practice, the rules of access to candidacy 
are often different and comparatively more demanding than the former. For instance, 
the age requirement in Brazilian national legislative elections is only sixteen for vot-
ing but increases to thirty-one for standing as a candidate. Similarly, a growing num-
ber of countries that have extended the right to vote to foreign residents in local 
elections have been more reluctant to let them run for the post of city mayor or even 
municipal councillor (see supplementary file online). We thus disaggregate at the 
onset the concept of electoral rights into its two main components: the right to vote 
(VOTLAW) and the right to stand as candidate (CANLAW).
All supporters of democracy share the view that suffrage should in principle be uni-
versal. However, disagreements eventually appear as soon as one leaves the realm of 
abstraction for the messier field of real-world democracies. For instance, a cosmopoli-
tan may see New Zealand, which grants the right to vote to foreigners in all types, and 
levels of elections after 1 year of legal residence, as more democratic than its Austral-
ian neighbour, which reserves that right to its own citizens. Conversely, a communi-
tarian may see the New Zealand practice as less democratic because it unduly dilutes 
citizens’ preferences and disrupts the fair representation of their interests in govern-
ment with the ballots cast by persons who did not signal their belonging to the political 
community through naturalisation. But even though there is no consensus as to what 
constitutes the ideal demos, arguing that the New Zealand legislation is more inclusive 
than the Australian one regarding non-citizen residents is an empirical fact that leaves 
no room for disagreement. Our indicators thus measure the relative degree of electoral 
inclusiveness of both voting and candidacy rights, a concept that minimises the need 
for normative judgment4 and allows for systematic comparison across time and space 
without privileging one conception of democracy over another.
The concept of electoral inclusiveness has two dimensions. First, eligibility 
restrictions determine who has the right to vote or stand as a candidate based on 
explicit legal qualifications. Second, access restrictions determine how those eligi-
ble can exercise their right to vote in terms of registration procedures and voting 
methods.5 We do not consider access restrictions for candidacy rights, because our 
4 ELECLAW can still be adapted and used for normative analyses. An example of a normative applica-
tion of ELECLAW is the Immigrant Inclusion Index (IMIX; Blatter et al. 2015b, 2017).
5 Our analysis of access-related restrictions is limited to the most widespread and significant restric-
tions that we found in the electoral legislation. We acknowledge that there may be other forms of access 
restriction that we do not capture. One may argue, for instance, that the degree of electoral inclusiveness 
is lower in those countries where elections are held on weekdays, e.g. the USA and the UK. However, in, 
those countries where elections take place on a working day, voters usually are offered a range of alterna-
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focus is on electoral rights as an aspect of citizenship rather than as a procedure for 
selecting office-holders. We also leave aside electoral regulations whose inclusive-
ness cannot be measured across time and space because this is contingent upon con-
textual factors. This includes mandatory voting and issues of voter representation, 
that is, how individual votes are aggregated into seats in legislative elections.6 This 
qualitative information can easily be retrieved in our online database and country 
reports.
Our measurement is based on de jure regulations as specified in electoral laws. 
This includes both primary and core aspects of implementing legislation, namely 
access restrictions. We therefore strictly focus on policy outputs and do not consider 
policy outcomes such as the number of affected voters or turnout. In doing so, we 
follow Easton (1965: 351), who defines “outputs” broadly to include both the “bind-
ing decisions” and the “implementing actions”. This analytical separation of outputs 
and outcomes enables causal analysis. As we make available disaggregated data, 
users can choose whether to narrow the notion of policy output to exclude imple-
mentation (see e.g. the approach of Helbling et al. 2017).
Democracy indices usually restrict the analysis to national legislative elections 
to highlight similarities and differences across states. By doing so, they obscure the 
fact that the rules of inclusion in the demos also vary within states, a phenomenon 
that can only be captured once one adopts a scale-sensitive view of contemporary 
democracies (Arrighi and Bauböck 2017). Theoretically, we identify three types 
of elections (executive, legislature, and referendum7) at four levels (supranational,8 
Footnote 5 (continued)
tive and arguably convenient voting methods to cast a ballot on election day, chiefly postal voting. Since 
it overlaps with our “voting” methods’ indicators, this aspect of the organisation of elections was not 
included.
6 Issues of representation are particularly relevant in the case of non-resident citizens in legislative elec-
tions. In most countries, votes are either merged with those of the electorate in their domestic constitu-
ency of origin or assigned to a particular constituency (assimilated representation). In other instances, 
they may directly elect their own representatives in Parliament through reserved seats for the diaspora 
(special representation). The latter has been introduced in a number of countries including France, 
Croatia, Colombia, Portugal, Italy, and Tunisia. However, whether one mode of representation is more 
electorally inclusive than another because it increases the relative weight of the external electorate is an 
empirical question that is contingent upon contextual factors in a particular election (Collyer 2014; Arri-
ghi and Hutcheson 2015).
7 Here, we understand “referendum” as a generic term for all democratic elections that consist in a gen-
eral vote by the electorate on a single political question which has been referred to them for a direct 
decision. This includes both referendums that were triggered “from the top” by the executive or legisla-
tive branches of government and those that were triggered “from the bottom” through the collection of a 
minimum number of signatures among the electorate, usually referred to as popular initiatives.
8 In our dataset, the supranational level includes elections to the European Parliament (28 member 
states), the Andean Parliament (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru), the Central American Parliament 
(El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama), and the Mercosur Parliament (Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela). However, some countries in our sample, like the USA, Can-
ada, Australia, or New Zealand, are not part of a supranational union endowed with a democratically 
elected Parliament.
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national, regional, and local9) that, once combined, lead to twelve potential kinds of 
elections periodically held in a single country. The table below shows these combi-
nations as well as the number of countries in our current dataset where they do exist 
as of 2015 (Table 1). 
Electoral inclusiveness not only varies across kinds of elections, but also across 
categories of potential voters and candidates. As mentioned in  the introduction, 
some of the most significant franchise restrictions in today’s democracies result 
from protracted international migration, which creates a mismatch between resi-
dent and citizen populations and leads to new forms of inclusion and exclusion. We 
thus distinguish between three categories of potential voters and candidates, which 
broadly correspond to sedentary, emigrant, and immigrant populations, respectively: 
resident citizens, who are citizens of a state in which an election is held and who are 
also permanent residents there; non-resident citizens, who reside outside of the ter-
ritory of the state of which they hold citizenship and in which the election is held; 
and non-citizen residents, who are residents in a state where the election is held, 
and who are not citizens of that state. To be sure, our legal categories of non-citizen 
residents and non-resident citizens are different from the sociological distinction 
between immigrant and emigrant populations. A person may still be registered as 
a resident in a municipality while living elsewhere, and a non-resident citizen may 
never have lived in her country of citizenship (Dumbrava 2014). But legal reality is 
precisely what the ELECLAW indicators aim to measure, and the conceptual dis-
tinction between our three groups of persons allows us to capture a broad range of 
restrictions while avoiding coding redundancies.
Some of these restrictions were easy to identify. As far as resident citizens are con-
cerned, electoral laws always specify a minimum age threshold, and qualifications 
Table 1  Levels and types of 
elections
The cells report the total number of elections based on the combina-
tion of types and levels in our sample of countries (N = 51)
Supranational National Regional Local Total
Executive 0 32 16 35 83
Legislature 42 51 33 49 175
Referendum 0 47 27 39 113
Total 42 130 76 123 371
9 Not all countries hold regional and local elections. For instance, some countries do not have a regional 
tier of government (e.g. Malta, Cyprus, Luxembourg), while in others, regional representatives are not 
directly elected (e.g. Ireland). In countries like El Salvador and Honduras, the local legislature is not 
directly elected. In the European Union, all countries hold municipal elections, but the local executive is 
indirectly elected in a majority of member states.
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on mentally disabled citizens or those who committed a criminal offence are almost 
as frequent. However, other restrictions are less obvious and came to our knowledge 
throughout the data collection process. For example, the persistence of qualifications 
targeting members of the armed forces and the clergy in several Latin American 
countries was somewhat unexpected and encouraged us to add another eligibility 
restrictions based on professions. Overall, the restrictions covered in ELECLAW 
aim to capture the particular challenges that each group of potential participants 
faces for accessing the ballot or running as candidates. For example, restrictions 
based on nationality only apply to non-citizen residents (cf. Fig. 3) and are meant to 
distinguish between electoral laws that selectively enfranchise nationals of specific 
countries (e.g. local elections in Spain or Bolivia) and those that do not discriminate 
between foreigners but only require a minimum length of residence in the country 
(e.g. all elections in Chile or local elections in Denmark). They are qualitatively dif-
ferent from restrictions barring naturalised citizens (e.g. all elections in Panama), 
dual citizens (e.g. national legislative elections in Bulgaria), or citizens born abroad 
(e.g. presidential elections in the USA) from standing as candidate, which are also 
covered under our resident citizen category (cf. Figs. 1, 2, and 3).
Measurement
ELECLAW is based on the resources of GLOBALCIT. The original material was 
gathered by country experts, who were asked to collect the electoral legislation in 
force in their country, to summarise the relevant legal provisions in a questionnaire, 
and to write a narrative report on access to electoral rights. However, the resulting 
databases were compiled centrally by our team. The coding of ELECLAW was also 
centralised: one specially assigned collaborator took the lead, while two additional 
collaborators checked the coding and discussed entries where there were uncertain-
ties or disagreements. In addition, most collaborators were involved in crafting the 
coding rules, which helped ensure that they were strictly adhered to or modified on 
the go to capture unanticipated and relevant real-world complexities. This centralisa-
tion strategy, together with our focus on de jure regulations, minimises the interpre-
tative bias which arises when the task of evaluating the data is delegated to national 
experts who are often less acquainted with the broader comparative picture.10
ELECLAW measures the degree of electoral inclusion of a given legal provision 
using a scale ranging from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 1. In case of eligibil-
ity restrictions, this usually translates into theoretical minima and maxima of 0 for 
“generally disenfranchised” and 1 for “generally enfranchised”. For all other indica-
tors, the determination of the minima and maxima is empirically determined, though 
these minima and maxima often reflect what is theoretically possible. For instance, 
10 While our coding method ensures a high degree of accuracy, it is not fully immune to residual errors 
or inconsistencies. We seek to correct false information in subsequent versions of ELECLAW. To this 
end, we are always open to user feedback.
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automatic registration is arguably the least cumbersome form of accessing the ballot 
and thus coded 1.
ELECLAW scales are ordinal. The number of points between the 0 and 1 end-
points varies depending on the relevant qualitative distinctions that can be drawn 
based on the data. The 0–1 scale is split up into equal intervals between the points 
to yield an intuitive ordinal construct. Distances between points on different scales 
therefore may vary and are not strictly comparable across individual indicators. Still, 
this method allows for plausible aggregation as long as the underlying measurement 
level is adequately considered in subsequent analyses.
Legend
Applies to voting rights (VOTLAW) and candidacy rights (CANLAW) 
Applies to voting rights (VOTLAW) only
Electoral inclusiveness 
for resident citizens 
in a given kind of 
election
Eligibility restrictions
Who has the right to vote/stand 
as candidate in principle?
Age
What is the 
minimum age for 
voting/standing as 
candidate?
Criminal offense
To what extent are 
citizens who 
committed a 
criminal offense 
disenfranchised?
Mental disability
To what extent are 
citizens with a 
mental disability 
disenfranchised?
Temporary 
absence
How cumbersome 
is it for citizens 
temporarily abroad 
on Election Day to 
cast a ballot?
Occupation
To what extent are 
members of 
certain professions 
(e.g. military 
personnel) 
disenfranchised?
Citizenship
To what extent are 
dual and 
naturalised citizens 
and those born 
abroad 
disenfranchised?
Access restrictions
How difficult is it to access the 
ballot?
Registration 
procedure
Is the 
registration on 
the electoral 
roll automatic 
or not, and if it 
is not, do 
voters have to 
register for 
each election?
Voting 
methods
How 
cumbersome is 
it to cast a 
ballot (e.g. 
postal voting 
versus voting at 
polling station)?
Fig. 1  Electoral inclusiveness for resident citizens in a given kind of election
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We illustrate the logic of measurement in ELECLAW by discussing three 
examples. The first is voting rights restrictions for resident citizens based on men-
tal disability (see Table  2). It was obvious from the start of our coding process 
that no disenfranchisement would be the most inclusive regulation, while a blan-
ket disenfranchisement of all legally incapacitated persons would be the most 
restrictive. In order to construct our mid-point scales, our attention was drawn to 
an influential 2010 judgement of the European Court of Human Rights that found 
that an absolute ban on legally incapacitated persons violated the right to free 
elections enshrined in the Convention.11 A key distinction arises between those 
electoral regulations applying to a general category of persons and those provid-
ing for a separate assessment of the functional abilities that are relevant for the 
Legend
Applies to voting rights (VOTLAW) and candidacy rights (CANLAW) 
Applies to voting rights (VOTLAW) only
Applies to candidacy rights (CANLAW) only
Electoral inclusiveness 
for non-resident citizens 
in a given kind of 
election
Eligibility restrictions
Who has the right to vote/stand 
as candidate in principle?
Residence and 
professional 
restriction
To what extent is 
the right to 
vote/stand as 
candidate 
subjected to past 
residence or 
limited to certain 
professions (e.g. 
military personnel)
Citizenship based 
restrictions
Can dual citizens 
residing abroad 
stand as 
candidates?
Access restrictions
How difficult is it to access the 
ballot?
Registration 
procedure
Is the registration 
on the electoral 
roll automatic or 
not, and if it is not, 
do voters have to 
register for each 
election?
Voting 
methods
How 
cumbersome is 
it to cast a 
ballot (e.g. 
postal voting 
versus voting at 
polling station)?
Fig. 2  Electoral inclusiveness for non-resident citizens in a given kind of election
11 Alajos Kiss versus Hungary, judgement of the European Court of Human Rights, 20 August 2010.
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act of voting (Raad et al. 2009: 624; see also Beckman 2014). We therefore drew 
on this aspect to construct an empirically informed four-point scale that measures 
how severe the exclusion is in a fine-grained way (cf. Table 2). It captures whether 
the disenfranchisement must be subjected to a proportionality test, and if it is not, 
whether it applies indiscriminately to all persons found to be fully legally incapac-
itated or hospitalised in a mental institution or to specific categories only. Accord-
ingly, France, where, since 2007, a judge must rule on the retention or abolition 
of the right to vote of a protected person when ordering or renewing a measure of 
Legend
Applies to voting rights (VOTLAW) and candidacy rights (CANLAW) 
Applies to voting rights (VOTLAW) only
Electoral inclusiveness 
for non-citizen residents
in a given kind of election
Eligibility restrictions
Who has the right to 
vote/stand as candidate 
in principle?
Nationality
Are all foreign 
residents 
enfranchised, or only 
citizens of specific 
countries?
Length of 
residence
What is the 
residency 
requirement for 
voting/standing as 
candidate?
Access restrictions
How difficult is it to 
access the ballot?
Registration procedure
Is the registration on the 
electoral roll automatic 
or not, and if it is not, do 
voters have to register 
for each election?
Fig. 3  Electoral inclusiveness for non-citizen residents in a given kind of election
Table 2  Voting rights restrictions for resident citizens based on mental disability
Indicator name: VRCMEN
No disenfranchisement 1
Separate judicial decision on disenfranchisement of hospitalised persons OR legally incapacitated 
persons
0.67
Automatic disenfranchisement for specific categories of hospitalised persons OR legally incapaci-
tated person
0.33
Automatic disenfranchisement of all hospitalised persons OR legally incapacitated person 0
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curatorship, was coded 0.67. By contrast, countries that disenfranchise all persons 
who were found legally incapacitated by a court decision, such as Argentina, Bel-
gium, Poland, or Portugal, were coded 0.33.
The second example concerns voting rights for non-resident citizens. This is to 
illustrate the importance of considering not only eligibility, but also access. Obvi-
ously, these restrictions are especially relevant for non-resident citizens: any attempt 
to measure their electoral inclusion without considering this dimension would miss 
a crucial institutional aspect, which is in fact often used by governments to constrain 
the influence of the diaspora (Turcu 2018; Arrighi and Lafleur 2017). Greece is a 
case in point. Although the right to vote from abroad is constitutionally enshrined, 
it has never been implemented, thus effectively disenfranchising the Greek diaspora 
unless voters travel back to the country on Election Day. This aspect is captured in 
our five-point eligibility indicator, which attributes a score of 0.25 to those elections 
where the enfranchisement of non-resident citizens exists in principle but was not 
implemented, and our voting method indicator, where the combination of in-country 
voting and non-subsidised travel corresponds to the most exclusive category and is 
thus coded 0 (cf. Table 3).
Spain provides a more subtle example. In 2011, the introduction of the “voto 
rogado”, whereby Spanish citizens abroad must activate their right to vote through 
a cumbersome procedure, considerably decreased turnout among the external elec-
torate in subsequent elections (Merino 2015). Again, this administrative hurdle is 
accounted for in our coding. On the one hand, in the absence of past-residence or 
professional restrictions on the right to vote from abroad, Spain was given the maxi-
mum score 1 on our eligibility indicator (i.e. generally enfranchised). On the other 
hand, the combination of an active registration procedure with frequent renewal and 
postal voting was translated into a lower score in our access indicator.
More generally, we treat the electronic or online voting method as the most inclu-
sive. One could argue that making available only this method excludes all those who 
are not digital natives. However, as there is no case we are aware of that allows for 
electronic voting without also supplying another method in parallel, this categorisa-
tion is viable. We therefore only code the most inclusive provision in case there are 
multiple options. The result is a four-point scale that captures how cumbersome the 
voting method is (see Table 3).
Table 3  Voting rights 
restrictions for non-resident 
citizens based on voting 
methods
Indicator name: VNRMET
Electronic voting 1
Proxy OR postal voting 0.75
Voting at embassy or consulate OR other polling station 
abroad
0.5
In-country voting, travel subsidised 0.25
In-country voting only, non-subsidised 0
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The third example is that of voting rights for non-citizen residents. Here, we 
were confronted with the differential treatment of various groups. The first distinc-
tion is that of EU Second Country Nationals (SCN) and Third Country Nationals 
(TCN) across EU member states. We developed separate indicators to measure their 
inclusion. The indicator for TCN also serves as a general indicator for non-citizen 
residents. Thus, when comparing EU states with non-EU states, users can choose 
to either use only the TCN indicators or the aggregated indicator that takes into 
account that all EU states must grant voting rights to EU citizens in local legislative 
elections.
Our strategy for dealing with potential complexities is simple. We use the average 
score in case of multiple codes. For instance, in Nordic countries, Nordic non-EU 
citizens (from Iceland and Norway) have a lower residence requirement for local 
voting rights than other TCN. The score for residence-based eligibility restrictions 
for TCNs is thus the average of the score for Nordic TCN and all other TCN. We 
can also accommodate more complex cases such as local legislative elections in 
Portugal, where Brazilians, Cape-Verdean, and citizens of countries with reciprocity 
agreements have different residence conditions. This highlights the flexibility and 
fine-grained nature of ELECLAW.
Aggregation
Our aggregation strategy is differentiated, according to specific aims and contexts. 
First, we do not combine different groups of potential voters and/or candidates into 
an aggregate score; these groups are kept disaggregated. Second, we leave differ-
ent levels of elections unaggregated, but argue that they can be aggregated depend-
ing on the research question. Finally, we do aggregate the indicators into composite 
scores for single elections as well as for levels of election.
We keep different categories of voters and candidates disaggregated because they 
concern distinct empirical dimensions that can no longer be recognised as such if 
they are buried under the gravel of an aggregate measure. For instance, if we want 
to compare countries regarding the expansion of the demos beyond the resident citi-
zenry, aggregating the score for non-citizen voters and the score for non-resident 
citizens can obscure relevant differences. Take the cases of Ireland and Mexico. 
Ireland has a high level of inclusion of non-citizen residents of all nationalities in 
local elections (score 0.92) but enfranchises only some specific categories of non-
resident citizens—i.e. diplomatic personnel and their spouses—in national elections 
(score 0.15). Mexico, by contrast, does not enfranchise any non-citizen residents on 
the local level (score 0), while having a high level of inclusion of non-resident citi-
zens on the national level (score 0.93). The resulting problem is obvious: a simple 
average would make us think that both countries are moderately inclusive (0.535 for 
Ireland vs. 0.465 for Mexico). To be sure, it would not be wrong to state that, over-
all, Ireland is more inclusive than Mexico. But since we do not know who exactly 
is included to what degree, such a statement is potentially misleading. Indeed, the 
example shows that aggregating across groups of voters makes us miss a crucial 
qualitative difference: Ireland has a post-national demos—where residence is both 
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a necessary and sufficient condition for voting, at least on the local level—whereas 
Mexico has a de-territorialised one—granting the right to vote to all persons holding 
Mexican citizenship, but only such persons. Therefore, although users can decide 
freely how to use ELECLAW data, we think various categories of voters or candi-
dates should be kept disaggregated.
Different levels of elections as well as voting and candidacy rights also form 
empirically distinct dimensions, variation on which would be obscured if they were 
fused together in a single measure. Therefore, we do not aggregate these dimen-
sions. However, in contrast to the conflation of groups of voters, they can be aggre-
gated if researchers are interested in composite country and/or group-level scores 
of electoral inclusiveness. However, since collapsing multiple dimensions into one 
leads to a loss of information, we caution users of ELECLAW to consider very care-
fully what aggregation and weighting scheme to apply.
For single elections, we do aggregate eligibility and access scores. At first glance, 
the choice of an aggregation procedure seems straightforward. We could just attach 
a higher weight to eligibility than to access—since eligibility is arguably more 
important than access—and then calculate a weighted arithmetic mean, but it is not 
that simple. Averaging implies that high access scores could compensate low eligi-
bility scores and this is logically inconsistent. More accessible ballots do not amount 
to more ballots; the number of eligible voters is not increased by making voting 
less difficult. This number can only be increased by increasing eligibility itself—
or it can be reduced by introducing further eligibility restrictions alongside access 
restrictions.
Consider the example of non-citizen suffrage in national legislative elections 
in Portugal, where Brazilians are enfranchised and registered automatically after 
3 years of residence. The 0.33 score for enfranchising one nationality can be modi-
fied by a deduction for the residence requirement (score of 0.75 on the residence 
indicator; transformed into a 0.05 deduction), but it is left untouched by the registra-
tion, which is automatic (score of 1 on the registration indicator; transformed into 
a 0 deduction). This yields a composite score of 0.28 for Portugal. By contrast, any 
averaging strategy using the original scores would lead to a score higher than 0.33, 
which would suggest a higher level of eligibility than the one indicated by the under-
lying scale capturing basic eligibility in terms of nationality. Such a strategy might 
still lead to intuitive aggregate scores, but it would do so at the expense of rigorous 
“concept-measure consistency” (Goertz 2006: Chapter 4).
We also aggregate single elections into levels of elections. However, we do not 
weigh specific provisions by the relative significance of the type of election or the 
relative power of different legislative chambers. We acknowledge that context sensi-
tivity and cross-national equivalence are important goals for valid concept formation 
and measurement. However, by isolating them from their broader political context 
we can avoid conflating our measures with variables that could be either a cause or 
consequence of the indicators. This is the reason why we always apply the arithme-
tic mean with equal weights to yield the aggregate score when we encounter sig-
nificant contextual variations, such as the relative power of legislatures in different 
political systems or the frequency of actual referenda.
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As an alternative to aggregating election types and levels into a single country-
wide score, ELECLAW also allows for shifting the unit of analysis to the elections 
themselves. The levels and types of election can then be used as independent vari-
ables forming parts of explanations for the degree of electoral inclusiveness in these 
elections (Arrighi and Bauböck 2017). For instance, the level of election is arguably 
important to explain the degree of non-citizen enfranchisement: local elections are 
far more inclusive than national ones (ibid.). Regarding non-resident voting rights, it 
could be hypothesised that not only the level of election but also the type of election 
is important. As we discuss in annex II, for example, the extraterritorial franchise 
in Latin America is mostly present in national executive elections, but much less 
frequent in parliamentary ones (see supplementary file online). In a similar vein, 
the candidacy age of citizen residents is on average much higher for national elec-
tions than it is for local and regional ones; in Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Slovenia, 
candidates in national presidential elections must be at least 40 years of age, while 
18-year-old candidates can run for local and regional executives. These examples 
point to the relevance of variations in the political systems in which these elections 
are held. Indeed, from that perspective we deal with a multilevel data structure—371 
elections nested within fifty-one countries—which provides another analytical strat-
egy to grapple with the scale sensitivity that is inherent to ELECLAW.
Conclusion
Existing democracy indices mainly track the increasing electoral inclusiveness in 
processes of democratisation regarding basic criteria such as property- or gender-
based restrictions and are often limited to the resident citizenry, as well as to national 
legislative elections. However, contemporary democratic polities continue to both 
expand and contract the franchise regarding various potential voters and candidates 
in multiple types of elections on multiple levels of government. ELECLAW pro-
vides a tool to compare the persisting voting rights and candidacy rights restrictions 
of resident citizens, non-resident citizens, and non-citizen residents for a total of 371 
periodically held elections across fifty-one established democracies on three conti-
nents in 2015. In the future, we will update ELECLAW to account for the latest leg-
islative changes in the countries already included in our sample, and we will expand 
our temporal and geographic coverage to earlier time periods and other regions. To 
this end, GLOBALCIT is open to collaboration with other research institutions.
ELECLAW can help to answer a variety of important questions across different 
literatures. First, relating to the literature on democracy measurement, ELECLAW 
can be analysed independently as a measure of electoral inclusiveness across estab-
lished democracies, or be built into existing democracy measurement tools to bet-
ter capture the fundamental dimension of inclusion. However, we would caution 
against conflating various dimensions in highly aggregated measures. Second, one 
could also analyse to what extent the general level, quality, or type of democracy is 
associated with voting right extensions for various groups of voters. Third, relating 
to the literature on the engagement of diasporas, ELECLAW can help reorient the 
focus beyond the analysis of positive cases to examining the full range of variation 
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of non-resident citizens’ voting rights across different levels of government, and 
how they relate with state-led diaspora policies (Gamlen et al. 2017). Furthermore, 
relating to research on non-citizen electoral rights or immigrant rights more gener-
ally, ELECLAW offers very fine-grained measures that leave the issue of aggrega-
tion across levels of election—which is especially thorny in the case of non-citi-
zens—to the individual researcher rather than conflating them in a way that is of 
debatable validity (see e.g. Earnest 2015). Existing research shows the potential of 
this approach: Joachim Blatter and colleagues have crafted the Immigrant Inclusion 
Index (IMIX; Blatter et  al. 2015b, 2017), which factors in an adapted and aggre-
gated version of ELECLAW to measure one of the components to assess the elec-
toral inclusiveness regarding non-citizen residents. Comparing twenty EU member 
states, they point to a substantial yet highly diverse “democratic deficit” with respect 
to immigrant inclusion.
As ELECLAW does not examine how non-resident citizens and non-citizen resi-
dents fall into those categories in the first place, another research avenue is to relate 
the inclusion of these groups to provisions for the acquisition and loss of citizenship. 
Indeed, ELECLAW can—and should—be combined with indicators for the acquisi-
tion and loss of citizenship such as CITLAW (Jeffers et al. 2017; Vink and Bauböck 
2013), which is another resource offered by GLOBALCIT. These databases allow 
researchers to analyse and compare the inclusion into the demos as defined by two 
distinct but interactive pathways.
Last but not least, CANLAW provides a crucial resource to address the glaring 
lack of investigation into the variation of the inclusiveness of candidacy rights. The 
legal imbroglio in the aftermath of the referendum on independence in Catalonia 
on 1 October 2017 illustrates the importance of restrictions on the right to stand as 
candidate, such as those based on criminal offence. In the regional elections of early 
2018, elected pro-independence candidates from the incumbent coalition—chiefly 
the former President Carles Puigdemont—were prevented from taking office. This 
was done, according to the Spanish government’s Deputy Prime Minister at the time, 
using “every tool made available by the laws and the constitution to make sure that 
a fugitive cannot be sworn in and become the head of the regional government”.12 
Recent events in Brazil also offer a telling example. The decision of the Electoral 
Court to reject the candidacy of former President Luis Ignacio Lula, currently serv-
ing a 12-year prison sentence for corruption, in the October 2018 Presidential elec-
tions, arguably had considerable implications on electoral outcomes.13 In a different 
12 Declaration by Soraya Saenz de Santamaria, deputy prime minister of the Spanish government, 
quoted in the article “Spanish government asks court to block Puigdemont’s bid to lead Catalonia”, Reu-
ters, 28 January 2018.
13 These examples are illustrative of the importance and salience of formal electoral rules regulating the 
right to stand as candidate in contemporary democracies. To be sure, we do not claim that the decisions 
of the Spanish Constitutional Court, the Brazilian Electoral Commission, or the Australian High Court 
are either illegitimate or undemocratic. In fact, as we have tried to show, one of the core strengths of 
ELECLAW is that it is designed to minimise the need for normative judgement, by focusing on de jure 
regulations and measuring their relative inclusion towards a specific category of persons, while leaving 
the question of whether they are more or less democratic to the appreciation of users.
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yet no less contentious vein, the numerous resignations of Australian Members of 
Parliament due to their dual citizenship in May 2018 are a stark reminder of the 
fact that, just as voting rights, candidacy rights are non-universal and distributed 
unevenly across and within established democracies. We hope that ELECLAW can 
kick-start intensified efforts to explore these contested frontiers of citizenship and 
democracy in the twenty-first century.
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